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JAPAN FINANCES THE WAR
By A. A. MAGNUS
WHAT YARDSTICX?
r we want to review Japan's financingof the war, the first great problem we
are faced with is what standard to
apply. By what yardstick are we to
measure the figures appearing in the
COUJ'8e of our study! Without a proper
yardstick, all the billions listed can easily
become confusing.
The first and most obvious ohoice
would be the figures of the last year
before the war, in this cue the statistics
for 1936, and to compare all later figures
to these. However, since the develop-
ments of the laat five years have been
eventful, not to say dramatic, one does
not do full justice to the dynamic figures
of war financing unless one chooees a
yardstick which adjusts itself to the
development.
Price indexes might serve; however, in
Japan they. are baaed to an increasing
degree on officially fixed prices. Hence
they no longer accurately reflect the
development of the entire economio life
and do not permit of any infallible con-
clusions regarding the actual basis of all
economio movement-the national in-
come. So it seems most practical to turn
our attention directly to the national
income it8elf, especially as we are for-
tunate enough to posae88 the latest esti-
mates preeented before the Diet sessions
in January 1~2 by the Japanese Minister
of Finanoe Kaya, who has based his own
financial policy on these figUl'e8.
JAPAN'S NATIONAL INOOIDII
The problem of the national income
has been closely studied in Japan. We
refer especially to a pamphlet published
in English by the Keizai Remmei, the
most important private economic organi-
zation in Japan. This pamphlet is en-
titled NatioMJ, Income 0/ Japan 1930-39
and represents an exhaustive study of
the various estimates published. If we
combine the figures of the estimates up
to 1939 published by the Keizai Remmei
(p. 102) with the statistics of Finance
Minister Kaya for 1940-42, we arrive at
the development of the Japanese national
income shown in the following chart.
For the ye&1'8 from 1932-1942 inolusive
we thus find an average annual inclease
in the national income of approximately
13 per cent. But, if only because of the
variation in the world's grain harvests, it
will always be difficult to avoid fluctua-
tions, even if an increasing number of
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are very rare. A fraction, usually very
small, of this family income is spent in
payment of direct taxes. The largest
part serves to pay for the daily needs,
and a small part can be saved.
THE FAMILY INOO~
The income of the Japanese family is
the smallest unit of whioh the national
income is composed. Usually not only
the head of the family earns money but
also children and close relatives who are
members of the household. Independent,
single persons, whose income is not in
one way or another related to a family,
states are replacing the passivity of
liberalism by the activity of a modern,
national economic policy. In the past
there were big leaps in Japan, as, for
example, the recovery of 1933, with an
increase of 19 per cent in the national
income, or the increase of 24 per cent The major task in financing war is to
from 1936 to 1937 which can be traced procure the largest possible share of the
to the China incident. In most years, family income for the State. In Japan.
however, only a slightly smaller figure direct taxation only servee this purpose
was achieved, IUlI93I mt1933 IDt.IM013U1!III2 to a small ex-
i.e., from 10 to 11 tent. The State
per cent. e x pen d s far
We must em- W greater efforts ill
phatioally 8tate urging the peo-
here that we pie to lower as
are not set - much as possible
ting up the na- )Ii that part of the
tional income as family income
a yardstiok in which is used for
order to calcn- JO the payment of
late directly daily needs and,
what part of instead, to in-
this national in- crease the share
come is being of savings. To
consumed and this must be
what part is be- added the fact
ing saved, for that t.hrough the
the purpose of heavy increase
discussing the of indirect taxes
prospeots for considerable
financing the 15 parte olthe fam-
war. The rela- ily's expendi-
tionship between ture on dailv
national income needs flow int~
and consumption the State treas-
is far too com- ury. If it is
plicated for that. seen to that the
We simply want ~ savings are deliv-
to use the na- ered into the
tional income as hand8 of the
a nonrigid stand- State and that
ard to aid our the direct and
comparisons. indirect taxes are
incieased, the State's share in the
national income will grow. Then the
State becomes to an increasing extent the
employer who gives work to a growing
part of the nation and whose expenditure
reappears in the family budget as income.
Generally speaking, therefore, the cir-
culation "family income-family expend·
iture - government revenue - govern-
ment expenditure-family income" be-
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90mes ·broader ·and broader; while the
other circulation "family in.come-family
expenditure-income of the producer
of commodities--expenditure of the pro-
ducer of commodities-family income"
decreases accordingly.
FIFTY-FOUR SPECIAL BUDGETS
The Japanese budget is a highly com-
plicated structure, which here can only
be described in broad outline. Its center
is the national budget, which embraces
the revenue and expenditure of the thir-
teen State ministries. Around this center
revolve the "special budgets," of which
there are at present fifty-four. Among
them are, for instance, the budgets of
all colonial administrations, of the various
communication administrations, and of
the monopolies. As a rule, each ministry
has its special budgets, in which State
funds are accounted for together with its
own regular revenues.
Most of the special budgets have under-
gone no major alterations during the last
five years and therefore have no great
influence on the change in the distribution
of savings and consumption. As a rule,
only minor loans are necessary to balance
them. The sum of 832 million yen of
government bonds to be issued for financ-
ing the fifty-four special budgets for
1942-43 (Oriental Economist, May 1942,
p. 239) is comparatively high. Normally,
the amount was much smaller, and we
shall therefore refrain from studying the
special budgets and limit ourselves to
following the development of the national
budget and the extraordinary account for
the China incident and for the GreaterEast
Asia War. These two budgets are of deci-
sive importance for the financial conditions
of the whole country. (The curves in
our chart representing ·these two budgets
are drawn according to figures published
in Oriental Economist, May 1942, p. 221.)
As we said before, the national budget
contains the funds granted by the Diet
to the thirteen State ministries. An
exception was made in the budget for
1942-43 in so far as the major part of the
expenditure for Army and Navy, which
was otherwise contained in the budget
of the War and Navy Ministries, w~
transferred to the extraordinary account
for the Greater East Asia War.
WAR EXPENDITURE AND ITS SECURITIES
The extraordinary account for the
China incident was opened in September
1937 by the seventy-second Diet. It
began with the expenditure for the
Japanese forces in North China ~nd
extended with the spread of the conflict.
As is only natural, no details are published
on how these funds are spent. But re-
cently a high officer declared in publio
that only 15 per cent of these expenditures
had had to be used for the hostilities in
China, the remaining 85 per cent having
been used for increasing the general armed
strength.
With the outbreak of the Greater East
Asia War, this extraordinary account for
the China conflict was transferred to the
newly opened account for the Greater
East Asia War. This latter extraordinary
a.ccount, however, is also not exclusively
a military budget. It contains in addi-
tion the grants for the South Seas de-
velopment funds, in other words the
entire financing of the economic recon-
struction of the newly conquered regions
of the Philippines, Malaya, the Dutch
Ea·st Indies, and Burma. In away,
these· rich, raw-materia.} countries rep-
resent the security for the entire financial
development of the future. No definite
figures can, however, be giv?n .in this
connection, as no one can predict ill what
order and to what extent the reconstruc-
tion will proceed.
This economic potentiality of the rich
southern territories must always be borne
in mind when considering that, as show;n
in Chart II, the national budget plus the
extraordinary account for the Greater
East Asia War has risen considerably in
comparison to the national income, name-
ly, from 25 per cent in 1937-38 to 62
per cent in the fiscal year 1942-43.
CONTROL OF INVESTMENTS
How are the means for these two main
parts of the State budget obtained.'
The national budget is financed almost
entirely by taxes, and only a small share
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is covered by State loans, as can be
seen from our chart.
Only in 1941-42 and 1942-43 did the
share increase of funds obtained through
the _ue of bonds. However, the extraor-
dinary accounts for the China incident
and the Greater East Asia War have
from the very beginning been covered
alm08t exclusively by the issuing of
bonda. Hence it follows automatioally
that the problem of floating State loans
has grown considerably in importance.
At the beginning of the China incident
the Japaneee Government was already
fully aware of the fact that the expendi-
turee arising from it would have to be
financed without foreign aid. Placed
entirely upon its own resouroes, the
Government therefore regarded it as
indispensable that the distribution of
means available for investment no longer
be left to chance.
The first step in the direction of State
control was the investment control law
pas8ed on September 27, 1937, which
obliged all finanoial institutions to obtain
the permission of a commi.ssion for any
large bond issue. The Bank of Japan
had a leading place in this commission.
In this way, the Bank of Japan was
placed in a position to form an opinion
on the amount of money available for
investment in bonds. It was aided in
this by having been given a key position
in the finanoing of the war. The Bank
of Japan has been underwriting all bonds,
issued generally once a month by the
Ministry of Finance, whether they are
bonds to cover the deficit in the national
budget or bonds for the extraordinary
expenditure for the China incident or, at
present, the Greater East Asia War.
llIA.KING IT EASY TO SAVB
The bonds issued every month by sanc-
tion of the Diet amount to from 400 to
1,000 million yen. As a rule, the Bank of
Japan takes the entire issue en bloc and
gives the Ministry of Finance bank notes
or power of transfer. With these funds
the Ministry of Finance and the other
Miniatries pay their bills or make down
payments on orders placed with industry.
In the hands of the payees, usually in the
hands of the owners of industry, this
money is transformed into wages and
profits and finds its way into the hands
of the financial institutions. At the last
two stages the decisions are made which
determine its investment and the carr)'·
ing out of the 84'vings program.
Are the wages and profits used for
consumption or for savings! For years
the Japanese State baa suooeafully been
attempting to prevent luxury artioles of
all kinds from being offered to the publio.
By this means, the decision between con-
sumption and savings is made more and
more in the favor of savings, and now
only a secondary decision remains to be
made: where is the money to be invested1
Here the financial institutions exert a
very strong influence; the institutions
themaelves, however, are again influenced
by the Government and receive their
instruotions from savings committees.
These savings committees originated
in March 1938, when the Ministry of
Finance organized a national saving~
mobilization center. In the meantimo.
the savings committees have changed
their name, but in practice the fact re-
mains that savings programs were worked
out in whioh the individual groupe of
financial institutions were given certain
minimum figures to supply. The organi-
zations formed by the various kinds of
finanoial institutions~rganizationswhich
have grown increasingly stable and were
given a semi-official status this year-
then distribute these quotas among their
subdistricts and their individual enter-
prises. The extent of the savings pro-
gram can be seen from the following
table:
Tuz.a I
UYDrU~U~38 TO 19U
(ill 1.000 miIlioIl yen)
err- 0rlMIa' '--I4f. AprD lOU, p. 177)
~ v... \For~nal For lDdU8tria1 TotalExp&naion
1938-39 6.0 3.0 8.0
1939-40 6.0 '.0 10.0
lH0-41 8.0 '.0 1%.0
UK1...%
I" version 7.6 6.0 13.6
2nd .. 1l.0 6.0 17.0
1lK%"'S 17.0 6.0 23.0
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VALUES ARISE FROM EXPENDITURE
By comparing the aims set up for
government bonds and those for industrial
expansion, we see that it has still been
possible to reserve a considerable share,
namely, 40 per cent, of the total savings
for investment in new factories. In most
war financing, a consumption is financed
which does not directly produce new
economic values for the post-war period.
In Japanese war financing, however, this
is not the case.
Let us first consider the 60 per cent
of savings which are needed to absorb
the government bonds underwritten by
the Bank of Japan. These funds made
it possible for the Japanese Army, as
early as 1937, to send large groups of
men to China, with the result that one
cannot speak of unemployment in the
mother country since 1938. This also
applies to the white-collar class, for whom
the chances of employment were especially
unfavorable. Furthermore, by occupying
rich raw-material areas in North and
~ntral China, the army has created the
possibility of purchasing raw materials
in a sphere dominated by Japanese cur-
rency. It is a well-known fact that this
is the only possible way of solving the
"have-not" question, which has been
mainly responsible for the present world
conflict.
With the extension of the China con-
flict to the Greater East Asia War, those
parts of the Japanese economy which
were adjusted to trade with the Anglo-
Saxon countries were forced to readjust
themselves. However, since the Japanese
armed forces have succeeded in one swift
blow after another and with comparative-
ly small losses in conquering the richest
raw-material areas in the world, even
the high. amounts required for govern-
ment bonds in the fiscal year of 1942-43
will represent an expenditure whioh will
create new economio values.
REVOL~ONDITNG WORLD ECONO~CS
Now let us tum to the 40 per cent of
the savings program which is needed for
the expansion of industry. It represents
industrial plants in the making, which
are of· revolutionary importance for the
entire structure of world economics.
From a oountry that exported. textile
raw materials and half-finished textile
products in order to be able to import
all other products of modem economics,
the war of 1914-1918 had transformed
Japan into a country that, to a growing
extent, manufactured oheap articles of
the consumption-goods industry from
imported. raw materials for her own
needs and a gradually expanding export
trade. Only for the first stages of the
metal industry, as, for example, for pig
iron, scrap iron, and steel bars, and for
machinery, was Japan still largely de-
pendent on imports from those countries
which have invented the modem forms
of warfare.
The investments of the savings pro-
gram under the heading of "Industrial
Expansion" are aimed at doing away
with this dependence on foreign countries.
Hence iron-producing plants and machine
works are being erected, so that after
this war we can expect that only that
type of trade will be carried on between
Japan and the countries outside of the
East Asiatic sphere which, according to
past experience, is carried on between
industrial countries of the same stage of
development. To judge by the experi-
ences made within Europe and in the
trade between North America and Europe,
trade between highly industrialized coun-
tries is extensive and profitable for both
sides.
INNATE THRIFl'
In regarding Japan's finanoing of the
China conflict, Anglo-American authori-
ties have, very shortsightedly, always
only considered the absolute figures of
the note circulation and of the budgets.
The question was never asked: what
does the Japanese Government do with
the money saved by the Japanese people1
These authorities should have known
that the Japanese people, far from being
inclined to extravagance, know the value
of money very exactly. Almost every
member of the Japanese national family
has always been accustomed to counting,
not only the 8en (the Japanese penny),
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but also the tebth of a sen, the "n.. The
extl'emely complicated and detailed reg-
ulations of the Ministry of Finance
concerning the budget, accounting in
private industrial enterprises, and in-
surance, show diligence and talent.
We can only roughly outline the savings
mechanism here. It should be bome in
mind that in Japan it is customary to
indicate the rate of interest, not in per
cent per annum, but in rin per day.
This explains the many figures behind
the decimal point when Japanese rates
of interest are given in the Westem
manner, that is, in per cent per annum.
For example, the statistics of the Bank
of Japan show that the rate for un-
conditional call money for Osaka in
April 1942 was between 0.676 and 0.875
sen per day, that is, 6f and 8f rin. Multi-
plying this figure by 360 days, we obtain
a rate of 2.43 to 3.15 per cent per annum.
By this very subtle graduation of the
rates of interest, a competition is poBBible
between the various financial institutions
such as is hardly known in Europe.
A. NA.TION SAVES
In savings statistics, besides ordinary
commercial banks, savings banks, trust
companies, the Postal Savings Bank,
various co-operative societies, insurance
companies, and direct share investmenta
are listed. The following table shows
how the savings have increased every
year in the various kinds of financial
institutions:
TDtaD
IXCJUWlJI DJ SAVDJ08 (ba IIIIIIIolI ,.,
(fnlIII 0riIMIrI B__ur. )fq ItN1, Po 1M)
~I~ 11140041 1114141
1'oItaI SavtDp Ballll .•. 8111 I. 1,716 1,8780rdIDarJ~ Ie-
__ aDd PI*al 111-
____e..•... 2111 28Cl .lS .-DepaIIta .. bub aDd•.,.buIb........ a,oet •• •• 6,817ne:.=.of••~.~ .u lNIS 11: 1.171-TnIA~ ........... 22. 2lI7 aa6
~flDII........ } .72 707 }W 028-Sa= :.o::~~~ 10' 1M
Ja~lD"'.
WaIIdafta .......... 1,161 1,7ll8 a,1M I,me
TuIalof ............ 7'- JO,2O& lS,8J7 11,.110OoaI ...CII' ........ 8,000 10.000 a,ooo 11,600
A comparison of the total savings with
the goal set for savings reveals that it
has been possible since 1938 to obtain
the necessary savings. For the fiscal
year 1941-42 we have taken the goal
set for savings before the outbreak of the
Greater East Asia War, since statistics
for ordinary insurance reserves, deposits
of credit associations, insurance funds,
co-operative credit associations, and in-
vestments in shares and debentures are
available only for the first nine months
of the fiscal year. As a result of the
outbreak of the Greater East Asia War,
the goal set for savings for 1941-42 was
increased to 17,000 million yen. Accord-
ing to the informal figures givcn on the
increase in savings during the first few
months of 1942, there can be no doubt
that savings are being successfully brought
up to the amount demanded.
In view of the difficulty and the novelty
of this task, it is a great triumph on the
part of the Government to have reached
this goal. It has done its share in aiding
this development by never using to the
full the amounts approved by the Diet
for bonds to be floated. By tillS means
it has done much to strengthen the con-
fidence 80 necessary in questions of credit.
RISING PRIOES AND PROSPERITY
So far we have not dealt with the
problem of the purchasing power of the
national income, of the State budget, and
of the savings. The reason for this is
that--eince there are obviously various
possible valuations-the problem of pur-
chasing power can only be fruitfully dis-
cussed after all figures connected with
Japanese war financing have been pre-
sented.
After all, the problem of price which
we are now approaching has 80 many
di1Ierent aspects that it is very difficult
to do justice to all these various points
of view. Those who have consciously
gone through the economic world crisis
of 1929-1932 are cured for the rest of
their lives of regarding a rise in prices
in itself as something dangerous. What
would many countries have given during
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OOVER.~MENT BONDS ARE ABSORBED
is not necessary to maintain prices for
less essential goods at so low a level.
The less essential an article, the more
can it be permitted to rise, in order that
the incentive to spend valuable savings
on this article be reduced to a minimum,
While the price index of essential goods
has risen very moderately, the bank-
note issue of the Bank of Japan has more
than tripled. The reason for this is
mainly a technical one. In all periods
of great political events, terms of payment
are shortened. Until 1937, yearly settle-
ments were customary in East Asia to
an extent hardly ever known in Europe.
During the last four years, however, cash
payments have become more and more
usual. Of course, this has led to a con-
siderable increase in the issue of bank
not.es. The development of the monthly
turnovers of the clearinghouses in March,
shown in the table, proves that the total
circulation has not increased as much.
These monthly turnovers of the clearing-
houses have only risen 41 per cent from
March 1937 to March 1942.
A further technical reason for the in-
crease in the issue of notes is the increase
in the amount of government bonds in
the hands of the Bank of Japan. While,
with a bank-note issue in March 1937 of
1,570 million yen, the Bank of Japan held
government bonds to the amount of 630
million yen, at the end of March 1942 it
held 5,020 million yen of government
bonds with a note issue of 5,310 million
YE'n. The reason for this is that the Bank-
of Japan is retaining a growing amount
of government bonds and using them as
cover for its note issue.
n
Wbolesale IDdrx or the Bank - Note I )(onthly
Bank of Japan at end of moe 01 the ITurnoTer 0
lIIcal&tear Bank of Ithe SCI Clear( .• 1000: 1(0) Jarcn at the1=-I
en of Marchi· (In
Domestic Total (In 1,000 mtll. 1,000 mill.
Rice Index yen) yen)
19;17 266 (~100) 239.8 (- 1(0) l.57 (-100) 8.1 (-100
19:18 2ll-l 25Ui 1.115 7.7
lIIaIl ao-& 264.8 2AO 8.5
11»0 375 311.9 3.31 10.6
1041 375 322.7 •.12 lU
1042 :l83 (-U5) 3S2.8(-U7) 5.31 (-338) 11.((-1411
th08e )'ea1'8 to be able to bring about
price increases like those experienced by
Japan since shortly before the beginning
of the China conflict!
We must point out above all that,
through price increases, all debtors with
debts at fixed rates of interest obtain
alleviation of their burdens of debt.
Moreover, they do not suffer from the
price increase, since the income from the
sale of their own products rises with the
increase in the price of the goods they
have to buy. The typical debtor of this
kind throughout the world is the farmer,
at least in those countries where the most
primitive forms of usury have been done
away with. Hence the price increases
in Japan have definitely aUeviated the
lot of the farmer, although not fully,
because the prices for various agricultural
products have not been allowed to rise
us much as those for goods which the
farmer must buy.
In the table below, we have compiled
from the price-index publications of the
Bank of Japan the wholesale rice index
and the wholesale index for 110 trade
goods together with the bank-note issue
of the Bank of Japan.
TABLE ill
A. UNIFORM RISE
For the l!&ke of cJearn-. the ftllurell for 1937 and 10.2 are re-
peated III bracltt'ta III IlJCb a way that thole for 11137 are regarded
II! 100. wbUe tboee for 11142 were cakulated on thla baaIa of 100.
The most important fact revealed by
this table is that, after five years of war,
it has been possible to maintain a whole-
sale index which has remained almost
exactly parallel to the rice index. So the
most important staple has risen only 45
per cent and the entire wholesale index
only 47 per cent. It is obvious that it
During the course of the five war years,
the system of note-issuing has been
modernized to a large degree. Gold and
commercial drafts no longer play any
part as note coverage, so that the absorp-
tion of the bonds floated by the Ministry
of Finance and underwritten by the Bank
of Japan has assumed overwhelming im-
portance. The following table shows how
they have been absorbed so far:
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T.uu IV
ISSUB AlfD ABlJO&PTlOlf or OOVB&1fDlIT BO!'fD8
raox IULY IllIS7 TO IUlWB 11M!
('rom on.w~. Jlay IN!, p. ISS)
lIoDdII I..-l BoDdaAbIorbed by the Market
<:aIeDdar \.MI' (Ia 1,000 IIII1l. (Ia 1,000 I1a1) IIII1l. ym) ~_t
lalyfl*. las7 1.3 0.7 641
~u.JDec. 1838 •.a a.8 88
.JULI Dee. I lISII 6.3 4.7 811
JULIn«. UNO 0.7 6.1 711
.JULIn«. Illtl 8.8 7.• Sf
lULl)(ar. IllfZ 1.0 U loa
An average of 85 per cent of the
government bonds floated from July 1937
up to March 1942 has thus been absorbed,
so that only 15 per cent have remained
unsold in the hands of the Bank of Japan
and have led to the. bank-note circulation
being increased. Theoretioally one might
say that the note issue, being mainly
respoD8ible for an increue in prices, need
only be maintained within its present
limits for the basic problem of war
financing to have been solved. In fu-
ture, the main thing would be to see
that 85 per cent of the government bonds
issued were always absorbed, and one
could then count on the price increase
remaining within the moderate limits
shown during the last five years. How-
ever, things are not quite as simple as
that.
First of all there is the small change,
issued by the Bank of Japan in addition
to its note issue and without cover. It
rose from II million yen in March 1937
to 452 million yen in March 1942. Al-
though these are amounts that do not
make much of a difference, they must
still be considered.
Then we must take into account the
absolute total of government bonds issued.
At the outbreak of the China incident,
the Japanese domestio indebtedness
amounted to 9,300 milli«;>n yen. By
March 1942, this amount had been in-
creaaed by 29,'00 million yen. At the
rate of interest of 31 per cent per annum
set for these bonds, the total of 38,700
million yen entails a yearly debit of 1,350
million yen. This burden is by no means
alarming, especially sinoe the interest
payments on government bonds in foreign
currency to the nominal amount of 1,200
million yen have ceased, as the creditors
were countries with whom Japan is now
at war.
So neither bank notes nor credit have
been inflated to a degree involving any
danger.
SKlLLJ'UL FINANCIAL PILOTS
Japanese financial circles and experts
are thoroughly acquainted with the most
modem works of financial theory from
all countries, either in translation or in
the original. Hence they know very
well that there can be no atal1U quo in
the value of the money, that, instead,
there are only two possibilities:
(1) Means of payment inorease faster
than goods=inftation.
(2) Goods increase faster than means
of payment= deflation.
It is, therefore. always a question of two
movements and their relationship to one
another. And the financial policy of a
country has only to see to it that the
pace of these two movements-increase
of goods and increase of means of pay-
ment-does not difter too much and that
inflation or deflation be kept within the
limits demanded by the situation.
Japanese economic writers are so well
trained in these modem ideas that their
discussions deal only with the question
of whether the border line between an
advantageous and a too rapid inflation
has been reached or not. No one is
frightened by the word "inflation" as
suoh, For the Japanese know, from their
own history as well as from that of other
states, that a mild inflationary tendency
can have its political advantages as a
curb on interest-bearing property and as
a oompensation for the natural economic
inferiority of the farmer as oppoeed to
capitalist trade. The limits for this
inflationary tendency are reached when
the desire to eave is threatened. That
these limits have not even appeared on
the horizon i.e shown by the good abeorp-
tion of the government bonds iBBued and
by the fact that no compulsory. eavings
measures whatever have been neoeesary.
The Japanese Army, which is oompoeed
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largely of rural circles, seems to be sup-
porting the principle of an inftationary
tendency as outlined above. In doing
this, it is fully aware of the limitations
of this financial policy, namely, that the
means of payment must always be kept
in .. certain relationship to the quantity
of goods.
ABUNDANCE REPLACES SHORTAGE
Between the freezing of the Japanese
foreign credits in July 1941 and the out-
break of the Greater East .A.sia War it
.:SOmetimes seemed as if the stagnation of
the turnover in clearings was going hand
in hand, not only with the extreme dull-
nees on the stock exchanges, but also
with a backward tendency in the move-
ment of goods as a whole. This repre-
sented a danger which was openly ex-
pressed in the economic press of the
country. The freezing had resulted in a
.shortage of raw materials and consequent-
ly in a decrease in the domestic supply of
goods. On the other hand, there had
been no change in the supply of money,
so that the precarious relationship be-
tween means of payment and supply of
goods became unbalanced. In order to
normalize the relationship again, Japan
hnd to obtain goods. Since the goods
of China and Indo-China were insuffi-
·cient, she made great efforts by peace-
ful means to obtain additional goods
from the Dutch East Indies. However,
all her patient negotiations with the
NEI Government for an adequate trade
agreement came to nought. Quite aside
from other considerations of grand poli-
tics, Japan had finally to take the
neoeesary steps to assure herself of
additional sources of goods.
Now that the Dutch East Indies and
large parts of southeastern Asia have·
come within the realm of Japanese cur-
rency and eoonomics, the creation of a
balance between the quantity of goods
and the means of payment baa become
simply a problem of transportation.
Within her sphere of domination, Japan
has raw materials in unlimited quantities,
and it is only neoessary to distribute
these goods with the proper speed and
in such a manner that they remain in
the appropriate relationship to the cur-
rent means of payment.
Thus Japanese war financing has turned
from a struggle with scarcity to the con-
trolling of a potential superabundance.
Without doubt, this is a new situation
for Japan, but a situation which enables
her to wage a war of any duration. This
means that the hitherto potential bottle-
neck "quantity of goods," or, in other
words, "raw materials," baa disappeared;
and if we ask for the next poesible bottle-
neck, then this is to be found in the
direction of proper employment and
adequate training of men, who, as regards
numbers, are sufficiently available. In
other words, it is to be found there where
Japan is strongest, where human will
power, endurance, and energy can accom-
plish the most.
